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THE COLLAPSE OF AN EMPIRE?   
RATING AGENCY REFORM IN THE WAKE OF 
THE 2007 FINANCIAL CRISIS 
 
Elizabeth Devine* 
“There are two superpowers in the world today in my opinion.  
There’s the United States and there’s Moody’s bond rating service.  The 
United States can destroy you by dropping bombs, and Moody’s can 
destroy you by downgrading your bonds.  And believe me, it’s not clear 
sometimes who’s more powerful.” 
—Thomas Friedman1
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1996, Thomas Friedman’s remarks echoed the sentiments of 
many.  The rating agency business was booming, and it seemed like the 
agencies themselves could do no wrong. Because nearly every financial 
business was limited in some way by credit ratings,2
In 2007, the fall of the U.S. housing market sparked a “once in a 
 a rating agency 
became the most powerful player in many business transactions.  If 
issuers and investors could keep the rating agencies profitable, and if 
rating agencies could provide issuers and investors with the ratings they 
needed, what could possibly go wrong? 
 
*  J.D., Fordham University School of Law, 2010; B.A., Georgetown University, 2005.  
The author would like to thank Professors Joan Caridi and Judith MacDonald for their 
insightful introduction to this topic.  The author would also like to express her gratitude 
to the editors and staff of the Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law for their 
valuable suggestions and superior editing skills.  Special thanks are also due to the 
author’s family and friends for their unwavering love and support. 
     1.    Interview by Jim Lehrer with Thomas L. Friedman, New York Times 
Columnist, on The News Hour, PBS Television (Feb. 13, 1996). 
 2. FRANK PARTNOY, INFECTIOUS GREED:  HOW DECEIT AND RISK CORRUPTED THE 
FINANCIAL MARKETS 66 (1st ed. 2003). 
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century credit tsunami,”3 resulting in a worldwide financial meltdown. 
The financial crisis was triggered by the failure of the market for 
collateralized debt obligations (“CDO”), particularly in the segment 
based upon subprime mortgages.4 The crisis began and has been fueled 
by the fact that the CDOs with the highest ratings were worth far less 
than their face amounts.5
As analysts begin to investigate who is to blame for the current 
financial situation, some argue it was the fault of overzealous lenders, 
others say that homeowners were simply borrowing well beyond their 
means, but many analysts now point fingers at the rating agencies 
themselves.  By giving mortgage-backed securities the top ratings and 
underestimating the risk of default and foreclosure, the rating agencies 
played a key role in inflating the housing bubble and contributing to the 
financial meltdown.
  In effect, their ratings were worthless. 
6  “How on earth could a bond issue be AAA one 
day and junk the next unless something spectacularly stupid has taken 
place . . . ? [M]aybe it was something spectacularly dishonest like taking 
that colossal amount of fees in return for doing what Lehman and the 
rest wanted.”7
The key to the rating agencies’ involvement in the financial crisis is 
that the unregulated ratings for asset-backed securities in CDOs became 
proxies for the full disclosure required by securities law.
 
8  The SEC 
detailed in a report that the rating agencies failed to accurately rate the 
creditworthiness of many structured financial products resulting in the 
overreliance by both the government and investors on the inaccurate 
ratings.9
 
 3. Kristofor W. Nelson, Note, Rough Waters for the Ratings Companies:  Should 
the Securities Ratings Companies Be Held Liable for Investor Reliance in the Wake of 
the Real Estate Meltdown of 2007-2008?, 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1177, 1177 (2009). 
  The consequences of this reliance came to the detriment of 
 4. Richard E. Mendales, Collateralized Explosive Devices:  Why Securities 
Regulation Failed to Prevent the CDO Meltdown, and How to Fix It, 2009 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 1359, 1361 (2009). 
 5. Id. 
 6. James Surowiecki, Ratings Downgrade, NEW YORKER, Sept. 28, 2009, at 25. 
 7. Kevin G. Hall, How Moody’s Sold Its Ratings—and Sold Out Investors, 
MCCLATCHY-TRIB. NEWS SERVICE, Oct. 16, 2009 (citing Lawrence McDonald, former 
vice president of Lehman Brothers). 
 8. See Mendales, supra note 4, at 1361-62. 
 9. Approaches to Improving Credit Rating Agency Regulation: Hearing Before 
the Subcomm. on Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored Enterprises 
of the H. Comm. on Financial Services, 111th Cong. 6 (2009) [hereinafter Capital 
Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored Enterprises Subcommittee Hearing] 
2011] RATING AGENCY REFORM 179 
investors, and later, the markets themselves. 
Though analysts, scholars and lawmakers struggle to find the exact 
cause of the financial meltdown, one thing is clear.  If we are going to 
reform the system, and prevent a similar crisis in the future, fixing the 
rating agencies should be at the top of the list.10
This paper argues that current securities regulation is not equipped 
to respond to another financial meltdown of this magnitude.  It suggests 
the best response to prevent another crisis is not to halt or alter the 
issuance of certain financial structures, but to reform the rating agencies 
that rate these structures, making the rating process more transparent and 
legitimate. 
  Congress must 
reevaluate how the rating agencies conduct their business.  With respect 
to how to reform the rating agencies, two questions come to mind.  First, 
are the rating agencies simultaneously too protected and too unregulated 
by the government?  Second, were the judgments of the rating agencies 
tainted? 
Part I of this paper describes the evolution of the rating agency 
business and the growth and importance of nationally recognized 
statistical rating organizations.  Part II discusses the growth of 
mortgage-backed securities and the increasingly important role rating 
agencies played in the securitization market.  Part III focuses on the 
collapse of the rating agency empire, analyzing the holes in the system 
that may have contributed to the 2007 financial meltdown.  Part IV 
questions the reality of reforming the rating agency business and 
discusses why past attempts at reform failed.  Finally, Part V argues that 
reform is necessary in order to recover from the current financial crisis 
and prevent a future one.  It focuses on the importance of transparency, 
and discusses proposed litigation regarding reform. 
I.  HISTORY 
Rating agencies have been around for about a century,11 beginning 
in 1909 when John Moody set about synthesizing all types of credit 
information into a single rating, publishing a manual called “Moody’s 
Analyses of Railroad Investments.”12
 
(statement of Spencer Bachus, Member, H. Comm. on Financial Services). 
  By the mid-1920s, the idea of a 
unified credit rating had caught on, and three competitors joined 
 10. See Surowiecki, supra note 6, at 25. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Roger Lowenstein, Triple-A Failure, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2008, at 36. 
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Moody’s: Standard Statistics, Poor’s Publishing and Fitch.13  Rating 
agencies rate debt obligations based on the ability of an issuer to make 
timely payments on securities.14  Ratings are meant to be an estimate of 
probabilities,15 and are not a recommendation to buy or sell.  Now, as it 
was nearly one hundred years ago, “a triple-A rating has been regarded 
as the gold standard for safety and security of these investments.”16
Though the ratings provided by the rating agencies were useful to 
investors, it was not until the 1930s, when regulators began 
incorporating ratings into their regulatory schemes, that the rating 
agencies gained popularity.  For example, the Banking Act of 1935 
provided that national banks could only purchase securities that were 
investment securities.
 
17  In 1936, the U.S. Treasury Department further 
classified this restriction on banks, defining “investment securities” to be 
securities that were not “distinctly and predominately speculative” 
according to a “designated standard” which must be “supported by not 
less than two rating manuals.”18 Other regulatory bodies soon followed 
suit, increasing the demand for ratings.19
 
 13. Id. 
  Despite this attempt to restrict 
what securities certain firms could purchase, one glaring loophole 
regarding the ratings remained.  Without further classification for which 
 14. Credit Rating Agencies and the Financial Crisis:  Hearing Before the H. 
Comm. on Oversight and Government Reform, 110th Cong. 1 (2008) [hereinafter 
Oversight and Government Reform Hearing] (statement of Henry A. Waxman, 
Chairman, H. Comm. on Oversight and Government Reform).  See also Steven L. 
Schwarcz, Private Ordering of Public Markets: The Rating Agency Paradox, 2002 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 1, 8 (2002). 
 15. See Lowenstein, supra note 12. 
 16. See Oversight and Government Reform Hearing, supra note 14 (statement of 
Henry A. Waxman, Chairman, H. Comm. on Oversight and Government Reform).  
Each rating agency has its own nomenclature unique to its rating scale, but each 
generally follows the same methodology.  Moody’s, for example, rates bonds on a scale 
with 21 steps, from AAA to C.  Ratings that begin with the letter “A” carry the least 
amount of risk, those beginning with “B” have moderate risk and those with a “C” 
rating are in poor standing or default. See Lowenstein, supra note 12.  For the purposes 
of this paper, references to “Triple-A” or “AAA” will denote bonds with the least 
amount of risk. 
 17. Kia Dennis, The Ratings Game: Explaining Rating Agency Failures in the 
Build up to the Financial Crisis, 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1111, 1117 (2009). 
 18. Darren J. Kisgen & Philip E. Strahan, Do Regulations Based on Credit Ratings 
Affect a Firm’s Cost of Capital? 6 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 
14890, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1353327. 
 19. See Dennis, supra note 17, at 1117; see also infra notes 31-39. 
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rating agency’s ratings could be used for these regulations, anyone could 
establish an arbitrary firm to provide “ratings” that would circumvent 
the effects of the regulations.20
The rating business grew at a slow and steady pace until 1970, 
when the sudden and unexpected collapse of Penn Central
 
21 caused 
investors to think twice about what information the rating agencies were 
providing.22
The government responded.  In 1975, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (“SEC”) decided to penalize brokers for holding bonds that 
were less than investment grade and created a category of officially 
designated rating agencies, “nationally recognized statistical rating 
organizations” (“NRSROs”) to determine what exactly “investment 
grade” meant and finally answering the question of which rating 
agency’s ratings could be used.
 Investors were furious that the rating agencies failed to 
foresee this bankruptcy.  The collapse of Penn Central put the rating 
agencies in the spotlight, and the idea of credit risk at the forefront of 
investors’ minds. 
23  The SEC immediately grandfathered 
the three existing agencies – Moody’s Investors Service (“Moody’s”), 
Standard & Poor’s (“S&P”) and Fitch – into the NRSRO category.24  
This designation made Moody’s, S&P and Fitch the “official arbiters of 
financial soundness,”25 and gave a tremendous amount of power to a 
small number of rating agencies.26 Dubbing the “big three” rating 
agencies NRSROs was supposed to make it easier for investors to know 
their investments were safe,27 and the new SEC regulations and NRSRO 
designation quickly turned rating agencies from mere opinion givers into 
indispensable gatekeepers.28
The rise of the rating agencies, and particularly the development of 
NRSROs, had a huge regulatory impact in the United States.  Originally 
used as a basis for judging the quality of securities that broker-dealers 
 
 
 20. See Kisgen & Strahan, supra note 18, at 8. 
 21. In re Penn Central Transp. Co., 484 F.2d 1300 (3d Cir. 1973). 
 22. See Lowenstein, supra note 12. 
 23. Id. 
 24. See Kisgen & Strahan, supra note 18, at 8. 
 25. See Surowiecki, supra note 6, at 25. 
 26. BARRY RITHOLTZ & AARON TASK, BAILOUT NATION: HOW GREED AND EASY 
MONEY CORRUPTED WALL STREET AND SHOOK THE WORLD ECONOMY 158 (2009). 
 27. See Surowiecki, supra note 6, at 25. 
 28. Id. 
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could use to satisfy their capital requirements,29 today, many investment 
rules and regulations are based on a bond’s credit rating as provided by 
the rating agencies, and particularly by NRSROs.30  For example, under 
the 1940 Act, taxable money market funds may not hold more than five 
percent of their assets in securities rated below the top tier ratings of at 
least two rating agencies.31  In 1951, the National Association of 
Insurance Commissioners established a “Securities Valuation Office” to 
assign risk ratings to bonds held in the investment portfolios of 
insurance companies.32  The Securities Valuation Office used ratings 
corresponding to those of the major rating agencies.33  Under the 
Secondary Mortgage Market Enhancement Act of 1984, “mortgage 
related securities” ranked in one of the two highest rating categories by 
at least one NRSRO were deemed acceptable investments for federal 
savings and loan associations and credit unions.34  In 1988, the 
Department of Labor instituted a regulation permitting pension fund 
investment in asset-backed securities only if they were rated A or 
better.35  By 1994, Savings and Loans, who had already gone through 
significant reorganization following the Banking Act of 1935, were 
prohibited from investing in “junk bonds,” as designated by the rating 
agencies.36  The Eurobond and Asset-Backed Securities markets now 
often require a certain rating for a firm in order for that firm to 
participate in the market.37  Even state regulations now require certain 
ratings as provided by NRSROs.38
Clearly, the scope and use of credit ratings, and particularly a rating 
provided by an NRSRO is vast, and well beyond its original intentions.  
The SEC acknowledges, “Although we originated the use of the term 
NRSRO for a narrow purpose in our own regulations, ratings by 
NRSROs today are used widely as benchmarks in federal and state 
legislation, rules issued by other financial regulators, in the U.S. and 
 
 
 29. See Mendales, supra note 4, at 1374. 
 30. See Kisgen & Strahan, supra note 18, at 6. 
 31. Id. at 7. 
 32. Id. at 6. 
 33. Id. 
 34. See Mendales, supra note 4, at 1369. 
 35. See Kisgen & Strahan, supra note 18, at 7. 
 36. Id. at 6. 
 37. Id. at 7. 
 38. Id. at 7-8 (stating that “California state regulations prohibit California-
incorporated insurance companies from investing in bonds rated below single-A.”). 
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abroad, and private financial constructs.”39
With so many institutions and regulatory bodies relying on the 
ratings granted by NRSROs, these entities became indispensible tools 
for institutional investors.  In the rating agency business, the “big three” 
(NRSROs Moody’s, S&P and Fitch) control 95% of the market.
 
40  A 
rating from one of these agencies was like a key that could unlock the 
regulatory system, giving institutional investors a wide range of 
investment possibilities.  In essence, a better rating by an NRSRO meant 
better regulatory treatment for these investors.41
The importance of an NRSRO’s rating on a firm is demonstrated in 
a study conducted by Darren J. Kisgen and Philip E. Strahan.
 
42  Since 
designating the “big three” NRSROs, the SEC has infrequently 
designated any additional agencies,43 leaving Moody’s, S&P and Fitch 
the only NRSROs.  However, in 2003, the SEC designated Dominion 
Bond Rating Service (“DBRS”) as the fourth NRSRO.44  Studying the 
effects of DBRS’s status as an NRSRO, Kisgen and Strahan found that 
the change in status from non-NRSRO to NRSRO changed the impact of 
DBRS’ ratings on a firm’s yield bonds.45
With respect to asset-backed securities, the rating from an NRSRO 
became an essential component in the sale of a corporate bond or 
package of mortgages.  Obtaining the highest, triple-A rating became a 
necessity
 
46 and issuers’ lawyers began spending a considerable amount 
of time negotiating with the rating agencies in order to achieve such 
ratings.47  The fact that the rating agencies were able to dictate what 
financial institutions could and could not do simply by way of what 
rating they attached to a particular securities gave the rating agencies, 
and particularly NRSROs the force of law. 48  This was a significant step 
for the rating agencies, considering they were private companies.49
Rating agencies and NRSROs gained even more power when they 
 
 
 39. Id. at 8. 
 40. See Dennis, supra note 17, at 1114 (Moody’s and S&P alone control 80% of 
the market.). 
 41. See PARTNOY, supra note 2, at 66. 
 42. See Kisgen & Strahan, supra note 18. 
 43. Id. at 1. 
 44. Id. 
 45. See id. 
 46. Surowiecki, supra note 6, at 25. 
 47. Mendales, supra note 4, at 1375. 
 48. Surowiecki, supra note 6, at 25. 
 49. Id. 
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were allowed to switch from having investors pay for their services to 
charging the issuers of debt for their services.50  Now, realizing they had 
an invaluable product, rating agencies were able to leverage their power.  
Since so many regulations required issuers to seek ratings from the 
rating agencies and NRSROs, the rating agencies started charging these 
issuers a pretty penny for favorable ratings,51
With the new payment structure, nearly every company that 
publicly traded bonds began paying the rating agencies directly for their 
services.
 and the issuers were 
willing to pay.  Suddenly, the rating agency business had grown from 
advisory, to necessary, to big-money-makers.  The rating agencies 
latched on to their profit potential. 
52  The average cost of these services ranged between $30,000 
and $100,000.53  In some instances, Wall Street paid as much as $1 
million for ratings.54
With the new millennium, both Moody’s and S&P went public and 
a push for an even greater revenue growth resulted.
 
55  In 2000, when 
Moody’s went public, mid-level executives at the company were given 
stock options.56  These executives therefore had incentive to consider 
not just the accuracy of their ratings but also the effect those ratings 
would have on Moody’s as a business.57  An investment bank might be 
willing to pay a higher fee for an AAA rating than a BB rating.  Not 
surprisingly, when Moody’s went public, its profits increased by 
900%.58  By 2002, Moody’s was worth more than Bear Stearns, which, 
at the time was a prominent investment bank.59  Revenues that were 
$800.7 million in 2001 soon topped $1.73 billion in 2005 and reached 
$2.03 billion in 2006.60
Although “[t]he public may think of [the rating agencies] as 
detached arbiters of security quality, like a financial Supreme Court . . . 
 
 
 50. Hall, supra note 7. 
 51. Lowenstein, supra note 12. 
 52. PARTNOY, supra note 2, at 66. 
 53. Id. 
 54. See Hall, supra note 7. 
 55. 60 Minutes: House of Cards: The Mortgage Meltdown (CBS television 
broadcast Jan. 23, 2008) (interview between Steve Kroft and Jim Grant) [hereinafter 60 
Minutes]. 
 56. See Hall, supra note 7. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Lowenstein, supra note 12. 
 59. Id. 
 60. See Hall, supra note 7. 
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[i]n fact, they were building booming, diversified, high-margin 
businesses.”61  Now that the rating agencies were money-hungry, profit-
driven companies, the business became more like selling “licenses” than 
issuing opinions.62  The rating agencies did their part to feed the 
enthusiasm and began targeting areas that would provide them with the 
fastest, greatest revenue growth.63  In the rating agency business, the 
more complex a financial structure, the higher the fee can be, and in the 
2000s, rating agencies jumped at the opportunity to rate the very CDOs 
based upon subprime mortgages that led to the eventual collapse of our 
economy.64
II.  THE ROLE OF THE RATING AGENCIES  
IN THE SECURITIZATION MARKET 
 
The origins of CDOs being based upon subprime mortgages, or 
mortgage-backed securities, which led to the current financial crisis, go 
back to the creation of the Federal Housing Administration (“FHA”) in 
1934.65  Before the FHA was established, mortgage lending was 
dominated by Savings & Loans (“S&L”).66  S&Ls used the deposits 
from their customers to make loans, and were therefore limited in the 
number and amount of mortgage financing each S&L could provide.67  
The FHA insured mortgagors and their successors in interest against 
mortgage defaults on loans, and between 1938 and 1970, three 
government-sponsored entities were created in order to facilitate the 
creation of a secondary market for these mortgages: the Federal National 
Mortgage Association, the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation 
and the Government National Mortgage Association.68  These 
government-sponsored entities (“GSEs”) began issuing mortgage-
backed securities.69
 
 61. CHARLES R. MORRIS, THE TRILLION DOLLAR MELTDOWN: EASY MONEY, HIGH 
ROLLERS, AND THE GREAT CREDIT CRASH 77 (2008). 
  The GSEs established strict underwriting and 
documentation standards and lenders who wished to sell their loans to 
 62. Id. 
 63. 60 Minutes, supra note 55. 
 64. Mendales, supra note 4, at 1361. 
 65. Dennis, supra note 17, at 1119. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
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the GSEs had to comply with these standards.70  By becoming de facto 
regulators of the quality of the mortgages they packaged, the GSEs 
played a substantial role in ensuring the quality of the loans behind the 
mortgage-backed securities they issued.71
Investors were drawn to the mortgage-backed securities issued by 
the GSEs because of the implicit government guarantee behind them that 
the GSEs were “simply too big to fail.”
 
72  Soon, realizing the potential 
of mortgage-backed securities, private institutions were created that 
issued mortgage-backed securities.  However, the private institutions 
lacked the “government guarantee” of the GSEs, and the biggest 
purchasers of the non-GSE mortgage-backed securities were big 
investment banks that did not uphold the same stringent underwriting 
standards of the GSEs.73
Mortgage lenders now had incentive to loan money to riskier 
borrowers, and sell those riskier loans to investment banks that would 
then issue the mortgage-backed securities to investors.
 
74  Investors 
purchasing the non-GSE mortgage-backed securities had no implicit 
government guarantee, and had no documentation regarding the 
underlying loans in the security.75 Therefore, the only indication of the 
quality of the loans rested upon the rating given to the security by the 
rating agencies.  “In a practical sense, it was Moody’s and Standard & 
Poor’s that set the credit standards that determined which loans Wall 
Street could repackage and, ultimately, which borrowers would qualify.  
Effectively, they did the job that was expected of banks and government 
regulators.”76
Though the rating agencies became the de facto watchdogs over the 
mortgage industry,
 
77 they were not loan officers.78 Rating agencies were 
often given one day to process, analyze and rate the credit data received 
from an investment bank.79
 
 70. Id. at 1120. 
  Despite the quick turnaround, the 
securitized products created by the mortgage-backed security scheme 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 1121. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Lowenstein, supra note 12. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
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quickly became the most powerful (and profitable) tool for the rating 
agencies.80  Because the rating given by a rating agency was essentially 
the only indicator of a package’s “worth,”81 the rating agencies took 
advantage of investment banks that were willing to pay high fees for 
high-rated securities.  “[T]he rating agencies charged fees on crappy 
AAA-rated paper that were twice as big on subprime paper versus 
prime-based loans.  And Bloomberg estimated that from 2002 to 2007, 
the agencies garnered fees on $3.2 trillion in subprime-based 
mortgages.”82
The “watchdog” role created a conflict of interest for the rating 
agencies.  The mortgage-backed securities sold and rated by the rating 
agencies did not have any fixed standards with respect to the quality of 
the underlying debt instruments.
 
83  With so much emphasis placed on 
the rating provided by a rating agency, “a system largely outside the 
bounds of securities regulation – the ratings issued by private rating 
agencies – largely displaced the structured disclosure requirements of 
securities law as the primary basis for investors’ purchase of the 
securities either as direct investments or as components of derivative 
securities.”84
With the failure of CDOs beginning in 2006 and reaching 
dimensions beyond anyone’s imagination by 2007,
  With no direct regulation, and no fixed standards with 
respect to the underlying debt instruments, could a rating agency 
essentially give a security any rating it wanted? 
85 many began to 
wonder whether the rating agencies did issue arbitrary ratings to these 
mortgage-backed securities.  In April 2007, Moody’s announced that the 
model it introduced in 2002 was no longer a good indicator for sub-
prime mortgages,86 and although the rating agencies tightened 
methodology for rating mortgage-backed securities beginning in the 
Summer of 2007, their efforts were too little, too late, and billions of 
dollars of securities were downgraded.87
 
 80. Id. 
 
 81. Id. 
 82. See RITHOLTZ & TASK, supra note 26, at 112. 
 83. Mendales, supra note 4, at 1368. 
 84. Id. at 1363. 
 85. Id. at 1362. 
 86. Lowenstein, supra note 12. 
 87. Id. 
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III. THE COLLAPSE OF AN EMPIRE? 
With so much weight placed on ratings as indicators of a mortgage-
backed security’s worth, many financial analysts are pointing blame for 
the 2007 financial crisis on the rating agencies themselves.  In fact, 
many now argue that the rating agencies knew what they were doing.  
Rating agencies were deliberately overstating ratings, with little thought 
to the underlying debt instruments, in order to win over investment 
banks and increase their revenues. 
This was a systematic and aggressive strategy to replace a culture 
that was very conservative, an accuracy-and-quality oriented 
[culture], a getting-the-rating-right kind of culture . . . that was 
supposed to be ‘business friendly,’ but was consistently less likely to 
assign a rating that was tougher than our competitors.88
 
 
Rating agencies were established to give opinions, and were 
therefore under no legal obligation to the investment banks for whom 
they issued their opinions.89  However, many now argue that the rating 
agencies may have been too “business” driven.  Some rating agency 
employees admit they did not realize there was a compliance aspect to 
the issuance of a rating.90
“The credit-rating agencies suffer from a conflict of interest – 
perceived and apparent – that may have distorted their judgment, 
especially when it came to complex structured financial products.”
 
91
Several factors account for the conflict of interest that may have 
altered the judgment of the rating agencies. First, the issuer-pays model, 
where rating agencies receive payment for their ratings from the issuers 
of the securities rather than the investors, shifts the focus of a rating 
from protecting the investors to marketing the ratings.
  It 
is this conflict of interest that may have made the rating agencies too 
money-hungry, resulting in illegitimate and worthless ratings and 
significantly contributing to the 2007 worldwide financial meltdown. 
92
Second, the rating agencies themselves were active participants in 
 
 
 88. See Hall, supra note 7 (quote by Mark Froeba, a senior vice president who 
joined Moody’s structured finance group in 1997). 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Lowenstein, supra note 12. 
 92. See Oversight and Government Reform Hearing, supra note 14, at 25. 
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the creation of the faulty-structured products, not objective third-party 
arbiters.  When sending a security to a rating agency: 
[u]nderwriters don’t just assemble a security out of home loans and 
ship it off to the credit raters to see what grade it gets . . . . Instead, 
they work with rating companies while designing a mortgage bond 
or other security, making sure it gets high-enough ratings to be 
marketable.93
For example, during the most recent real estate boom, S&P rated 
most senior tranches of sub-prime mortgage-backed securities AAA, and 
issued upgrades to its junior tranches that were initially given lower 
ratings.
 
94
Third, the banks themselves were gaming the system.  Investment 
banks were designing securities to “just meet” the rating agencies’ 
tests,
 
95 and in return, the three major rating agencies, Moody’s, S&P and 
Fitch were “engaged in a form of payola.  They were willing to play 
along with the investment banks, putting triple-A ratings on paper that 
turned out to be junk – if the price was right.  Call it ‘pay for play.’”96 It 
should be no real coincidence, then, that the big investment banks would 
return again and again to the same rating agency despite astronomical 
fees.97
Finally, the weight placed on the ratings of mortgage-backed 
securities is itself, its own worst enemy. 
 
The real problem is not that the market . . . under weighs ratings 
quality but rather that in some sectors, it actually penalizes quality . . 
. it turns out that ratings quality has surprisingly few friends: issuers 
want high ratings; investors don’t want ratings downgrades; short-
sighted bankers labor short-sightedly to game the ratings agencies.98
Where the system itself is not looking for quality ratings, why 
should a rating agency put forth extra effort to supply “quality” when a 
 
 
 93. See RITHOLTZ & TASK, supra note 26 (quoting Aaron Lucchetti, How Rating 
Firms’ Calls Fueled Subprime Mess, WALL ST. J., Aug. 15, 2007, at A1). 
 94. Nelson, supra note 3, at 1186. 
 95. Lowenstein, supra note 12. 
 96. See RITHOLTZ & TASK, supra note 26. 
 97. Lowenstein, supra note 12. 
 98. Raymond McDaniel, Confidential Presentation to Moody’s Board of Directors 
(Oct. 21, 2007), available at http://content.lawyerlinks.com/library/sec/briefs/2007/moo 
dys/moodys_declaration_111708_F.pdf. 
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client does not look for it? 
The inherent and apparent conflict of interests drove some rating 
agencies to take drastic measures to ensure a profitable, booming 
business.  Moody’s is said to have fired analysts and executives who 
warned of trouble before the housing market collapsed in 2007.99  
Moreover, it pushed out employees in its compliance department, 
replacing them with “business people” who had given the highest ratings 
to pools of mortgages that were later downgraded to junk.100
The creation of privately sponsored mortgage-backed securities 
coupled with the power granted to rating agencies by regulatory bodies 
and NRSRO designation made it impossible for investors to not rely on 
the ratings issued by the rating agencies.  Moreover, it may have let the 
rating agencies exert too much influence on the securities they rated.
 
101  
Once a mortgage-backed security was given a rating, and if that rating 
were AAA, investors no longer cared about the underlying debt 
instruments.102
Investors were not the only party who failed to recognize the 
underlying debt instruments in a security.  The rating agencies 
themselves do not perform due diligence to ensure adequate 
documentation for each mortgage pooled into a mortgage-backed 
security, nor do the rating agencies adhere to the same strict standards of 
the GSEs.
  Too much reliance on one ingredient is a risky game to 
play, and investors and the rating agencies should not have let a 
security’s rating become a rubber-stamp to buy or sell. 
103  The rating agencies further failed to account for the effects 
of the deterioration of underwriting standards as was reported by the 
Office of the Comptroller of Currency.104  In each of the years 2004 
through 2007, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency reported 
that banks had eased their underwriting standards.105
In light of the recent financial collapse, financial analysts and 
investors point out that the models used by the rating agencies were 
  By failing to 
account for these changes, rating agencies continued to assign high 
ratings to mortgage-backed securities likely composed of riskier and 
riskier loans. 
 
 99. See Hall, supra note 7. 
 100. Id. 
 101. See Surowiecki, supra note 6, at 25. 
 102. See Lowenstein, supra note 12. 
 103. See Mendales, supra note 4, at 1377; see also supra notes 71-72. 
 104. See Dennis, supra note 17, at 1126-27. 
 105. Id. 
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based on historical data that did not reflect accurate characteristics of 
subprime mortgages.106  Rating agency models rely upon the historical 
performance of a class of assets in order to predict how it will perform in 
the future,107 but with respect to subprime mortgages, had the rating 
agencies based their models on more recent data, their ratings may have 
been more accurate.  Agencies typically resist changing their models and 
assigned ratings because when they do, the change tends to be belated, 
widespread and big.108  Due to the restrictions imposed by regulatory 
bodies, institutional investors cannot hold many low-rated securities.  
Therefore, when rating agencies downgrade their ratings, it leads to 
forced selling and magnified panic and prevents others from buying the 
securities.109
Rating agencies have no real incentive to update their statistical 
models to reflect changing market conditions because there is an 
absence of effective competition.
 
110  S&P and Moody’s have enjoyed a 
near duopoly in rating asset-backed securities111 and the SEC has helped 
promulgate this “big boys club.”  From 1975 to 2000, the SEC 
designated only four more firms as NRSROs, but mergers always 
reverted them back to the “big three,” Moody’s, S&P and Fitch.112  
Though a rating agency must apply to the SEC in order to obtain 
NRSRO status, the SEC has never provided qualifications for NRSRO 
designation, making it infinitely difficult for rating agencies to obtain 
recognition.113
 
 106. Id. at 1124. 
  The process of obtaining NRSRO status has been 
criticized for its lack of transparency regarding qualifications and for 
 107. Id. 
 108. Surowiecki, supra note 6, at 25. 
 109. Id.  For example, despite market consensus, throughout the summer and fall of 
2001, the rating agencies kept Enron at investment grade, despite the fact that its credit 
was deteriorating.  On November 28, 2001, S&P finally changed Enron’s bond to sub-
investment grade, causing the stock to collapse.  Four days later, Enron filed for 
bankruptcy. See Lowenstein, supra note 12.  In another example, when the S&P 
downgraded General Motors to speculative grade, its bonds fell 8%.  One reason for the 
8% drop was that the downgrade prohibited many institutions from owning the debt. 
See Kisgen & Strahan, supra note 18, at 3. 
 110. See Mendales, supra note 4, at 1375. 
 111. Id. at 1377. 
 112. See Kisgen & Strahan, supra note 18, at 9. 
 113. Id. (“The primary guidance for whether a firm would qualify [as an NRSRO], 
was that the firm should be ‘nationally recognized’ in the United States and be an issuer 
of ‘credible and reliable ratings.’”). 
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effectively limiting the number of certified rating agencies.114
 
IV. THE REALITY OF REFORM? 
 
“You have legitimized these things, leading people into dangerous 
risk.”115
With rating agencies (and particularly NRSROs) blessed by the 
government to have the official word with respect to the ratings assigned 
to securities, very few people ever questioned the veracity of the rating 
agency business.
 
 
116
Even with the inclusion of ratings in so many facets of financial 
regulatory schemes, NRSROs owe no clear legal responsibility to the 
public to rate securities with care.
 The rating agency process ran like a well-oiled 
machine (that is, until the collapse of the housing market and the 
resulting financial windfall).  With so many aspects of business 
transactions affected by the rating agency business, is it possible to 
reform rating agencies in a way that will prevent another financial 
meltdown in the future? 
117  In fact, previous courts have held 
that the opinions of rating agencies are the equivalent to editorial 
commentary that is constitutionally protected under the First 
Amendment.118  Some argue, however, that it is unfair for rating 
agencies to be protected when accounting firms also give opinions and 
can be sued.119
 
 114. Id. at 8-9. 
  Until future courts find that rating agencies are no longer 
afforded their First Amendment protection, it will be difficult to find an 
NRSRO liable for damages with respect to its ratings. 
 115. See RITHOLTZ & BARRY, supra note 26, at 158 (a July 2007 e-mail from an 
executive of Fortis Investments, a money management firm, to Moody’s). 
 116. Id. 
 117. See Dennis, supra note 17, at 1144. 
 118. See Nelson, supra note 3, at 1189.  See also Dennis, supra note 17, at 1121 
(stating that rating agencies have asserted that they are financial publishers and that as 
financial publishers, they are entitled to the heightened protections of the “actual 
malice” standard.  Under the “actual malice” standard, a publisher will not be liable for 
false statements unless the statement is made with knowledge that it was false or with 
reckless disregard for its truth or falsity.). 
 119. The Latest in the Financial Services Crisis:  Government Control v. The Free 
Market, Speech at the 2008 National Lawyers Convention (Nov. 21, 2008), in 5 J.L. 
ECON. & POL’Y 259, 263 (2009). 
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Rating agency reform may not be possible simply because previous 
attempts at reform have failed.  After the collapse of Enron, Congress 
ordered the SEC to investigate the rating agency business and reform the 
rating process, but the SEC failed to do so.120  In 2006, Congress passed 
the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act (“CRARA”).121  CRARA sought 
to bring the rating agencies within the jurisdiction of securities laws,122 
but prohibited the SEC from “regulating the substance of credit ratings 
or the procedures and methodologies by which any NRSRO determines 
credit ratings.”123 CRARA also required that the SEC establish clearer 
guidelines for which firms could qualify for NRSRO status124 and 
required that rating agencies applying for NRSRO status discuss its 
methods and general procedures in its NRSRO registration 
application.125 It did not, however, require that the rating agencies 
disclose the data underlying its statistical models or other methodologies 
applied to the individual securities being rated.126
Though a valiant attempt at reform, CRARA was ineffective.  
While CRARA aimed to generate more competition among NRSROs by 
establishing clearer guidelines for the qualification of NRSRO status, it 
required that a rating agency be in business for at least three years before 
the SEC could accredit it.
 
127  Moreover, it required that an agency 
applying for NRSRO status provide written certifications from at least 
ten “qualified institutional buyers.”128
These provisions create a Catch-22: securities that do not receive 
high ratings from agencies accredited as NRSROs cannot be used as 
regulatory capital and are therefore difficult to market; but an agency 
cannot be accredited unless it can rate securities for at least three 
years and get recommendations from at least ten satisfied clients.
 
129
CRARA was also ineffective in that it ignored many of the 
concerns expressed by the SEC, such as transparency in the rating 
 
 
 120. See Lowenstein, supra note 12. 
 121. See Mendales, supra note 4, at 1385. 
 122. Id. 
 123. See Dennis, supra note 17, at 1114. 
 124. See Kisgen & Strahan, supra note 18, at 9. 
 125. See Mendales, supra note 4, at 1386. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
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process.130
The rating agency business has remained unchanged because no 
one bothered, or wanted to change it before.  “The rapid increase in 
demand for ratings of mortgage based securities and CDOs created an 
environment in which the benefits of inaccurate ratings outweighed 
potential costs.”
 
131  First, the profits generated from issuing ratings on 
mortgage-backed securities were immense, regardless of their 
accuracy.132  Second, evidence that investment banks would pay higher 
fees to rating agencies that awarded them higher ratings suggests that 
rating agencies cared less about their reputation than the amount of fees 
they earned.133  Third, there was such a high demand for the ratings of 
mortgage-backed securities that the investors themselves seemed to care 
less about the reputation of the rating agency or the accuracy of the 
rating.134  Finally, because rating agencies are not subject to liability 
when their ratings are included in prospectuses, their liability costs are 
so low, it is not a deterrent to issuing inaccurate ratings.135
The above rationales for inaccurate ratings really highlight the point 
– do people really care?  Last summer, the SEC announced plans to 
reform the rating agency business, but pressures by big investors 
squashed them.
 
136  Evidently, the investors involved in the rating process 
see no reason to fix what may not necessarily be broken.  There were a 
host of other factors besides the inaccuracy of credit ratings that 
contributed to the 2007 financial meltdown.  However, with so much 
exposed now, an economic recovery may depend in part on a reform of 
the rating agencies.  Investors must stop depending so heavily on 
ratings, but what investors still depend on must be truthful and accurate.  
“‘If credit remains paralyzed, small banks cannot finance the housing 
demand.  They have to take [investment banks] these mortgages and 
move them to a global audience . . . . That can’t happen unless the world 
trusts the gatekeeper.’”137
 
 130. Id. at 1387. 
 
 131. See Dennis, supra note 17, at 1133. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. See Surowiecki, supra note 6, at 25. 
 137. See Hall, supra note 7. 
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V. NECESSITY FOR REFORM 
Though investors may not want the ratings business to change, and 
despite previous reform failures, in the wake of the housing market 
collapse it is clear that the rating agencies deliberately underestimated 
the risks of mortgage-backed securities in pursuit of their own self-
interests, to the detriment of investors, and ultimately, the market.138
[It] provides a ready-made excuse for failure: as long as you’re 
buying AAA-rated assets, you can say you’re being responsible.  
After the housing crash, though, we know how illusory those AAA 
ratings can be.  It’s time for investors to face reality: working with a 
fake safety net is more dangerous than working without any net at 
all.
  
The only way to prevent rating agencies from remaining conflicted 
gatekeepers is to impose some type of reform that will eliminate the 
greed and deceit from the rating agency business.  As the rating agency 
business stands now: 
139
One dominant view of regulation of rating agencies is the 
“reputational capital” theory.  The “reputational capital” theory holds 
that a rating agency’s interest in maintaining a reputation for accurate 
ratings will be sufficient incentive to insure accurate ratings by that 
rating agency.
 
140  In the 1920s, near its inception, the rating agency 
business did operate along a “reputational capital” model.141  When a 
rating agency issued its rating, investors and analysts would comment 
on, and often disagree with the agency’s rating.142
Interestingly, scholars still supported the “reputational capital” 
theory in 2002 finding that a “lack of official public scrutiny does not 
appear to affect ratings accuracy because of the de facto accountability 
  With this type of 
investor involvement, rating agencies were driven to issue accurate 
ratings.  There was no correlation between the fee a rating agency 
received and the rating it issued.  Under a “reputational capital” theory, a 
reputation for accurate ratings alone would bring in business. 
 
 138. See Dennis, supra note 17, at 1114. 
 139. See Surowiecki, supra note 6, at 25. 
 140. See Dennis, supra note 17, at 1114. 
 141. Frank Partnoy, The Siskel and Ebert of Financial Markets?: Two Thumbs 
Down for the Credit Rating Agencies, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 619, 640 (1999). 
 142. Id. 
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of rating agencies through reputation.”143  It was then hypothesized that 
the NRSRO designation of a rating agency would act as an indirect form 
of merit regulation.144
Another view of rating agency reform suggests that giving more 
rating agencies NRSRO designation could radically alter the incentive of 
rating agencies to issue accurate ratings.
  An NRSRO designation signified government 
approval, therefore an NRSRO should have been driven to issue 
accurate ratings because it had a government-like reputation to uphold.  
Since 2002, however, it has become apparent that neither merit 
regulation by way of an NRSRO designation nor “reputational capital” 
is sufficient to promote rating accuracy among the rating agencies. 
145  As the system stands today, 
NRSROs are private profit-maximizing entities that will always 
maximize short-term benefits with long-term losses likely suffered.146
Rating agencies’ contribution in the most recent financial crisis 
suggests that reputation and merit-based reform alone will not change 
the current behavior and business models of the rating agencies.  
Something must be done to restrict the rating agencies so that their 
ratings lose a little bit of their aura and investors trust them a little bit 
less.  The government is in the best position to restrict the powers of the 
rating agencies by enacting legislation that reforms their business 
models. 
  
The addition of more NRSRO-designated entities creates more 
competition among NRSROs, potentially cutting profits from an 
NRSRO that is not issuing accurate ratings. 
Curtailing investor reliance upon ratings, and particularly 
inaccurate ratings, begins with reducing the notion that rating agencies 
are fully endorsed and supported by the government.  One proposal 
suggests that NRSROs should be changed from “nationally recognized 
statistical rating organizations” to “nationally registered statistical rating 
organizations.”147
 
 143. Steven L. Schwarcz, Private Ordering of Public Markets: The Rating Agency 
Paradox, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 15 (2002). 
 Though it may be difficult to change the implication 
of “NRSRO” when the acronym itself does not change, the use of the 
term “registered” versus “recognized” removes a sense of endorsement 
 144. Id. 
 145. See Kisgen & Strahan, supra note 18, at 23. 
 146. See Dennis, supra note 17, at 1132. 
 147. Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored Enterprises 
Subcommittee Hearing, supra note 9 (statement of Spencer Bachus, Member, H. 
Comm. on Financial Services). 
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by the government. 
Others suggest removing NRSRO designation all together.  
Moody’s itself favors doing away with the official designation,148 but 
without any type of rating agency registration, we will revert back to the 
problem of “ratings according to whom?”149
As discussed in Part III of this paper,
 
150 the rating agency business 
did not do its due diligence with respect to rating mortgage-backed 
securities.  “This system will not get fixed until someone credible does 
the necessary due diligence”151 and many propose that legislation be 
enacted to ensure that rating agencies follow a high standard of review, 
much like that followed by the GSEs.152  At minimum, Congress should 
impose regulations that require NRSRO designated firms to have 
sufficient analytical and operational resources in their company.153
The rating process needs to become more transparent “so that a 
rating is more than a ‘black box’ representing the unregulated label 
placed by a credit rating agency on the creditworthiness of securities so 
complex that even financial institutions cannot use traditional securities 
disclosure to evaluate risks embodied by a CDO.”
 
154  In an attempt to 
make the process more transparent, the SEC proposed new regulations 
that “would require the disclosure of all information provided to an 
NRSRO for the formulation of a rating by issuers, depositors, 
underwriters and other parties involved in issuing securities . . . .”155  
However, the SEC proposal says nothing about the nature or reliability 
of the information provided to NRSROs by these entities.156 Moreover, 
this proposal could create a new type of competition among rating 
agencies.  Instead of competing for higher fees, rating agencies could 
begin “compet[ing] for business by offering high[er] ratings based on 
minimal documentation.”157
 
 148. Lowenstein, supra note 12. 
 Less documentation means that rating 
agencies may give uninformed opinions, once again leading to the 
 149. See supra notes 18-21. 
 150. See supra notes 103-115. 
 151. See Hall, supra note 7. 
 152. See supra notes 71-72. 
 153. Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored Enterprises 
Subcommittee Hearing, supra note 9, at 6  (statement of Robert F. Auwaerter, Principal 
and Head of the Fixed Income Group, Vanguard Group). 
 154. See Mendales, supra note 4, at 1363-64. 
 155. Id. at 1403. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. at 1404. 
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problem of inaccurate ratings. 
The SEC proposed to further increase transparency in the rating 
agency business by requiring that all information used in ratings become 
available to all NRSROs, not just the rating agency providing the 
rating.158  Full disclosure to all rating agencies is meant to act as a peer-
to-peer check system, but under the proposed rule, NRSROs are under 
no obligation to verify each other’s information.159  There is a concern 
that full disclosure to all rating agencies will universally limit disclosure 
because issuers may not wish to share all information with all rating 
agencies.160
Realistically speaking, the most effective approach to a more 
transparent rating system involves a two-step due diligence requirement 
by which professionals employed by issuers and underwriters provide 
complete and verified data to the rating agencies who then document the 
statistical models they apply to the data and their application.
  If an issuer is not willing to share all of its information with 
its rating agency because it fears full disclosure to all NRSROs, again, 
rating agencies may give uninformed opinions, leading to less reliable 
ratings. 
161  In 
addition, issuers and underwriters should be required to provide rating 
agencies with a wide array of information. The rating agencies 
themselves are already requesting a greater amount of information162 in 
an attempt to catch any fraud that may have worked its way into a 
security.163
In addition to increased transparency in the rating system, and 
because a rating is an essential component in a CDO, the rating agencies 
should be subject to regulation beyond that imposed by CRARA, and 
much like accountants and underwriters, the SEC should take the helm 
in enforcing these regulations.
 
164 In addition, the SEC should consult 
with and create an independent body, comparable to the Public 
Company Accounting Oversight Board.165
 
 158. See Dennis, supra note 17, at 1146. 
 
 159. Id. 
 160. Auwaerter, supra note 153. 
 161. See Mendales, supra note 4, at 1415. 
 162. See Dennis, supra note 17, at 1127. 
 163. See Lowenstein, supra note 12.  For example, rating agencies would want to 
ensure that each of the loan applications for the underlying mortgages in a mortgage-
backed security were not fraudulent. 
 164. Mendales, supra note 4, at 1409-10. 
 165. Id. 
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This body would include representatives of the rating agencies 
themselves, the SEC, the Federal Reserve, and other government 
regulatory agencies making use of the rating process, along with 
representatives of the legal and auditing professions, and 
professional economists.  Its functions would include evaluating the 
effectiveness of statistical models used by the rating agencies, 
assuring that the agencies update the models frequently based on 
experience and macroeconomic conditions, and assuring that the 
agencies properly apply the models, both in the initial issuance of 
securities and in periodic review of the ratings.166
NRSROs argue that an independent oversight board would force 
rating agencies to have similar views and stifle their ability to issue 
valuable opinions.
 
167  However, an independent oversight board could 
create a baseline standard that each rating agency must follow when 
issuing ratings.168  As a baseline, rating agencies would be free to 
impose higher standards on themselves, which could give a rating 
agency a competitive edge.  The oversight board should frequently 
update its baseline to prevent a rating agency model that looks 
backward, while our lives, and investments, move forwards.169  In 
addition, in light of the recent economic events, it is reasonable to 
require an asset-backed security to meet a minimum standard in order to 
receive a top rating, and the creation of an independent oversight board 
would create those guidelines.170
In 2009, the House of Representatives proposed a bill to amend the 
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 and address the recent 
shortcomings of the rating agencies.
 
171 The Accountability and 
Transparency in Rating Agencies Act (“H.R. 3890”) “builds on the 
Administrations [sic] proposal and takes strong steps to reduce conflicts 
of interest, stem market reliance on credit rating agencies and impose a 
liability standard on the agencies.”172
 
 166. Id. 
  This bill is an important step 
 167. See Dennis, supra note 17, at 1148. 
 168. See Mendales, supra note 4, at 1410. 
 169. See supra notes 103-110.  The rating agencies’ failure to account for the 
deterioration of underwriting standards and their models based on historical data 
resulted in inaccurate ratings that contributed to the 2007 financial crisis. 
 170. Id. 
 171. H.R. 3890, 111th Cong. (2009) (Oct. 21, 2009 draft). 
 172. Press Release, H. Comm. on Financial Services, Financial Services Committee 
Approves Bipartisan Credit Rating Agencies Reform Bill (Oct. 28, 2009), available at 
http://www.house.gov/apps/list/press/financialsvcs_dem/pressCRA_102809.shtml. 
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towards reform of the rating agencies because “[a]s gatekeepers to our 
markets, credit rating agencies must be held to higher standards.  We 
need to incentivize them to do their jobs correctly and effectively, and 
there must be repercussions if they fall short.  This bill will take such 
steps.”173
H.R. 3890 expands on initial legislation proposed by the 
Administration in that it (i) clarifies the ability of an individual to sue 
NRSROs, thus making NRSROs more accountable with respect to their 
ratings; (ii) adds a new duty to supervise an NRSRO’s employees and 
authorizes the SEC to sanction supervisors for failing to do so; (iii) 
requires each NRSRO to have a board with at least one third 
independent directors and those independent directors are responsible 
for overseeing policies and procedures aimed at preventing conflicts of 
interest; (iv) enhances the responsibilities of NRSROs with respect to 
conflicts of interest that arise out of the issuer-pays model, and contains 
new requirements aimed to mitigate those conflicts of interest; (v) 
requires greater public disclosure of information regarding the internal 
operations and procedures of NRSROs; and (vi) requires that when an 
employee of an NRSRO goes to work for an issuer, the NRSRO review 
the work of that employee to make sure that all procedures were 
followed and proper ratings were issued and report that information to 
the SEC.
 
174
 
CONCLUSION 
 
As we begin to recover from the 2007 financial crisis, it is clear that 
by giving mortgage-backed securities the top ratings and 
underestimating the risk of default and foreclosure, rating agencies made 
a significant contribution to the financial meltdown.  Rating agencies 
were initially established to provide investors with a reliable, 
standardized rating of the creditworthiness of a security.  However, with 
time, a few regulatory “rubberstamps” and a voracious market requiring 
immediate ratings, rating agencies became booming, profit-driven 
businesses.  The rating agencies were doing so well, it seemed that they 
could do no wrong.  That is, until 2007, when it was discovered that the 
CDOs with the highest ratings were worth far less than their face 
 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. 
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amounts. 
Revenues, conflicts of interest and the regulatory schemes 
themselves may have all contributed to these inaccurate ratings.  With 
the financial world pointing blame at the rating agencies, their empire as 
we once knew it, is bound to collapse.  Many suggest that in order to 
prevent another financial crisis, we must reform the rating agency 
process.  Reforming the rating agencies, however, may not be an easy 
task.  Issuers and investors still crave high ratings, may still be willing to 
pay enormous fees for those ratings, and previous attempts at reform 
have failed.  Moreover, where no one is quite sure what really went 
wrong with respect to the financial crisis and inaccurate ratings, 
legislation proposed to reform the rating agency business may fail to 
address misaligned incentives, and revise procedures that have worked 
all along. 
That said, this paper argues that in order to prevent another 
financial meltdown, our best defense is to enact legislation that will 
reform the rating agencies, making the process more transparent and 
legitimate.  This will best be accomplished by first granting the SEC 
with the power to enforce the regulation of rating agencies. 
The SEC should curb investor reliance on the rating agencies by 
changing NRSROs from “nationally recognized statistical rating 
organizations” to “nationally registered statistical rating organizations.”  
This change will help to remove some of the implicit government 
guarantee and endorsement from the rating agencies. 
The SEC must next create an independent oversight board for the 
regulation of the rating agencies comparable to the Public Company 
Accounting Oversight Board.  This oversight board can effectively make 
the rating process more transparent and legitimate by creating a baseline 
standard that each rating agency must follow when issuing ratings.  This 
baseline standard must be updated frequently to account for such things 
as market trends in order to maintain the most accurate ratings possible. 
Together with the independent oversight board, the SEC must make 
rating agencies more accountable for their ratings by imposing a two-
step due diligence requirement and by requiring public disclosure of 
their rating methods.  In addition, the SEC should be granted the power 
to sanction rating agencies that fail to fulfill their due diligence 
requirement or fail to uphold any standards set forth by the oversight 
board. 
Even if less emphasis is placed on a credit rating, the U.S. financial 
markets still depend upon the ratings issued by the rating agencies.  
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Thus, to rid the world of rating agencies is not an option.  However, in 
order to secure our financial markets, the rating agency empire needs to 
be reigned in and controlled.  By way of SEC enforcement and an 
independent oversight board, a more transparent and legitimate rating 
agency business will do just that. 
 
